I. DESIGN THE OPTIONAL section on social choice theory of the CAL logic course (Suppes & Sheehan, 1981) is the successor to a previous course called "social decision theory." The new theory (SeT) was designed to improve on the old (SDT) in the following aspects:
These design changes were motivated by three principal considerations. First, we wanted to give elegant proofs of Sen's result on the impossibility of Paretian· liberalism together with Arrow's classic impossibility theorem (Sen, 1970; Arrow, 1963) . Sen', simpler but still remarkable result was not included in SDT. It was added to provide an intermediate-level impossibility result which is easier for the student to learn and understand. It also serves to indicate by example the existence of a wide class of impossibility results in axiomatic social choice theory of which Arruw's is only the most striking and best known.
The second major consideration was to structure and streamline the axiomatic development so that one mathematical concept could be seen giving rise to others with the rhythm and naturalness characteristic of good mathematical writing.
The third consideration was a desire to have the theory developed in parallel in both a clear, compact formal notation and in an informal
The research repOl-ted in this article was partially supported by National Science Foundaticin Gnull SED 7709698 to Stanford University_ COHEN language containing the intuitive English counterparts to the formal notions. Elementary concepts of social choice theory-preference, indifference, preference orderings, social choice-are well-understood in everyday discourse and common-sense decision-making. The consumer knows what it means to prefer the more expensive model to the cheaper one, or to be indifferent between the red car and the blue one. And the voter is familiar with democratic methods of determining social choice. The intuitive content of many of the concepts of social choice theory offers considerable pedagogical advantage for an advanced course in elementary first-order logic. An emphasis on logic as a tool for formal deduction can be balanced by an equal amount of attention to the use of formal methods to analyse and capture the structure of intuitive concepts.
Accordingly, considerable effort went into developing parallel languages and structuring questions, definitions, and theorems so that the student can learn to translate back and forth from the formal to the informal language. The student can see the intuitive meaning of a formal expression in its corresponding informal translation, and conversely the theoretical meaning of an informal expression can be seen in its corresponding formal translation.
We now discuss and give examples of typical design changes in each of the three categories.
Revisions to Axiomatic Theory
A primary source of difficulty in developing a CAl version of social choice theory which uses an interactive theorem prover is the fact that all of the choice structures required to prove any interesting results depend on informal principles of set existence. Like most other branches of formalized mathematics, social choice theory lives inside informal set theory and the existence of simple objects is frequently left unstated in formal developments. This convenient informality is not possible in CAl theorem-proving applications. If the theorem-prover is to know about the existence of all the appropriate objects, either it has to have customary principles of set existence built-in or it must have access to a list of axioms which contairis the necessary existence principles. The Institute's theorem prover is used in different courses including a course on axiomatic set theory and hence changing its basic algorithms was not feasible. Instead it was necessary to supply the prover with a list of appropriate existence principles.
For SeT one simple existence axiom is used for Arrow's result. Sen's theorem required three very simple axioms but each is a slight variation of the other. Stated in the informal language here is the first existence axiom for Sen's result. (The sort of the variables appears in parentheses.)
For any (alternatives) x, y, u, v, if x¥=-)' and u ¥-v then for any (individual) j, there is an (island) N such thatj likes x better than y .on Nand everyone exceptj likes u better than v on N.
This axiom provides profiles of individual preference or "islands" as we call them where for example everyone agrees x is better than y, or where j likes v better than u and everyone else likes u better than v.
Another important change in the axiomatization is the elimination of non-relativized preference statements. All of the elementary theory of preference structures for individuals and indeed for society can be developed without reference to profiles or configurations of individual choices (which we call "islands"). However, in relating individual to social choice the ethical axioms require reference to islands~Hence all the theorems based on ethical axioms are expressed in a language which relativizes descriptions of individual or social choice to configurations. The axiom of independence ,of irrelevant alternatives, for example:
If for every i, i likes x better than y on N iffi likes x better than y on M, then society likes x better than y on N iff society likes x better than y on M.
makes essential reference to profiles or islands N.
Rather than develop the elementary notions in a notation which would be abandoned once the ethical axioms were introduced we chose to develop the entire theory in terms of descriptions of preference which are relã tivized to profiles or islands. By introducing islands near the beginning, actual individual preferences are viewed in a space of possible preferences. The notion of different possible islands of individual preferences where individual preferences vary leads to the notion of variations in individual and social choice and hence to the notion of the dependency of social choice on individual choice. The introduction of ethical axioms to describe the dependency of social choice on individual choice is then a natural step.
Curriculum
The design of the new curriculum was directed by several goals, among them maximizing the value of having parallel languages, using the hint mechanisms extensively in proof exercises, and using interactive questionanswer exercises at each stage to test comprehension and insert material not explicitly covered in the text.
The curriculum attempts to use the parallel languages to teach a general lesson about the use of mathematical logic as an analytical tool. Many questions are directed not only at testing and extending comprehension of the theoretical content but at developing an ability to translate back and forth from the formal language into the informal language. To translate from one language into the other is to see one expression as an analysis of the other and this is one of the most important theoretical uses of elementary mathematical logic.
Wherever possible. intuitive terms and descriptions were used in place of formal terminology. As an example, instead of the term profile or configuration we introduce the notion of an island of preferences, an .!'"-imaginary place where the individuals live, their preferences varying from island to island.
Another important feature of curriculum design was the use of lessons preceding proofs in which, by a series of questions, the student is allowed to discover the key ideas to be used in forthcoming proofs.
Parallel Languages
The formal and informal languages are parallel in the sense that each expression in one language has a surface translation in the other which has the same "deep" semantical interpretation in an internal LISP-like representation. If an expression F in the formal (informal) language is a translation of an expression! in the informal (formal) language thenF and E have the same LISP-like logical form L.
The surface languages are defined by a context-free grammar that assigns syntactic and semantic structures to expressions by associating semantical representations to syntactic productions and using principles of semantic compositionality to build up the logical form. Thus, for example, the rule for conjunction:
S->S&S
has associated with it the semantics (AND ;1; ;3;)
where; 1; and ;3; indicate the semantic values ultimately returned by the parse of the 1st and 3rd strings in the right hand side of the production. The resulting logical form is composed of the logical forms of the conjuncts. The set of these logical forms comprises the language of social choice theory understood by the theorem-prover. In this LISP-like language all formulas are viewed as lists and prefix notation is used to simplify the symbol-matching and manipulation algorithms used by the theorem- (with non-logical relation symbol "lndividuaIStrictPref", constant symbol "(sue)" and sorted variables x, y, N). Because surface translations are assigned the same deep structure, they are identical to the theorem prover and hence in doing proofs the student may use either expression interchangeably without having to resort to definitions. The student can type expressions to the computer in either format and by selecting the formal or informal style have the parsed expression printed on the screen in the other style.
A distinctive feature of the design of the SeT grammar is the nonatomic treatment of the symbols used in semantic composition. This departure from standard notions of semantic compositionality was chiefly motivated by a desire to eliminate redundancy in grammar rules. We also wanted to explore the degree to which computational semantics differs from the type of natural language semantics typically used in logic and linguistics.
Consider the sentences 1. i likes x better than y on N; 2. society likes x better than y on N;
with the corresponding logical forms:
Assume we are using a single set of rules to describe both individual and social choice, S -7 NP VP is the top rule, and "society" and "i" are NPs.
Then it is impossible for the grammar to produce different semantic structures for the non-logical relations IndividualStrictPref and SocialStrictPref using only (i) the given prefix notation, (ii) one set of context-free rules for both individual and social choice, and, most important, (iii) the standard notion of the atomicity of the symbols used in semantic composition. An unambiguous production has only one semantic attachment. Hence given the use of single prefix notation and the atomicity of symbols used in semantic compositionality the semantic de<::ision between a single prefix for strict social or individual choice must take place at a single stage of semantic analysis. At some point the grammar must decide in favor of either strict individual or social choice and can only use one symbol to mark this distinction. Because the prefix is atomic it cannot be semantically composed in several stages of syntactic analysis. The consequence of atomicity is a multiplication of production rules, one set for individual choice and another for social choice.
The way we avoid this departure from the notion that (I) and (2) have essentially the same syntactic structure (and hence the same top-level production can be used for both of them) is to revise our notion of semantic compositionality. In general, symbols used in representing logical forms are regarded as unanalysable with no internal structure. Thus~as a token in semanticalese meaning "greater than or equal to" is not usually regarded as composed of> and =; AND is not analysable as "A" and "ND"; + is not regarded as minus with a I. Similarly it would be unusual to regard the relation symbol for strict social choice-SocStrictChoice-as composed of Soc and StrictChoice. However, by treating such "meanings" as non-atomic and adding the appropriate form of concatenation to our notion of semantic compositionality redundant production rules can be eliminated.
Attaching the semantics "(;1;;2;)" to the rule S .... NP VP, "Ind" to the lexical rule for individual NPs, "Soc" to the lexical rule for social NPs, "StrictChoice" to the lexical rule for the canonical VP form "likes x better than y in N", and appropriate semantics for the remaining categories dominated by the VP, produces the desired results where ;u;;v; denotes the concatentation of the semantic values u and v. In general, semantic compositionality does not treat meanings as decomposable in this fashion. Rather than multiply productions, however, we treat the symbols used in the representation of logical form as nonatomic and use concatentation in the process of building logical form.
Much time and care was spent in designing a clean, compact, and formal notation for use in inputting and displaying proofs. We do not yet have data on which language the students prefer to use. However, the formal language is shorter, more concise, and takes up less space on the screen so it is likely to be preferred by most students when doing proofs. Either language can always be used to input formulas and, as mentioned above, the student has a choice which language to use for external display. 1. developmental' an appropriate set of axioms, 'definitions, and theorems to formalize the theory.
2. provision of a curriculum containing text-displayed lessons on formal theory and on informal content, background information, illustrations of central concepts, questions to answer" and theorems to prove.
3. definition of a formal language using acontext-free-grammar and first-order semantics.
4. definition of a fragment of English to give informal counterparts to all the concepts used in the formal theory again with a context-free grammar and first-order semantics.
5. programming a scanner to handle all characters used in the formal and informal language.
6. definition of an output grammar to translate the internal first-order semantics into either the formal or informal language.
7. compilation of the above levels of implementation.
8. debugging the resulting course.
Implementation of the formal theory consisted in compiling a list of theorems, axioms, and definitions in a special list format which is understood by the course driver and theorem prover. The format provides slots for a number, a name, and an abbreviation-all of which may serve to identify the entry during interactive proofs. As an example, here are the entries for the Completeness axiom and the Trichotomy theorem:
The use of the formal language is not essential here but provides for conCIseness.
Implementation of the curriculum consisted in writing and compiling VOCAL lessons which contain commands for displaying text templates, brightening sections, questioning the student, evaluating the replies, giving answers and hints, adding or dropping axioms, definitions or theorems from the theorem list available to the prover, and invoking the theoremprover when the student is invited to do a proof.
Implementation of the parallel languages consisted in building a context-free grammar for the formal language together with LISP-style semantics. Each grammar rule has an associated semantic representation. As the parser parses an expression it builds up the internal semantic representation of the input using the semantic representation which is attached to each grammatical rule. The resulting "meaning" is a translation of the expression into a LISP-like first-order language which the theoremprover understands. Once the grammar is completed a new parser incorporating the grammar is compiled and the result is tested.
In general the selection of a formal or informal notation is a relatively straightforward matter. But in designing a notation for CAl applications there are several additional considerations which complicate the selection. One must select the simplest, most aesthetically pleasing set of symbols that expresses all the necessary distinctions and agrees with appropriate linguistic conventions. In addition, notations used for CAl must also be 1. in the input character set supported by terminals, 2. in the output format set supported by output format programs, 3. easy for the user to learn and use at the terminal, and 4. in the set of strings scanned and parsed by the course parser.
These further design considerations may severely limit one's choices in language design. However at IMSSS much effort has been expended to ensure that 1-4 limit one's choices as little as possible. This has been achieved by extending the usual character set to include the standard notation used in set theory and logic.
The scanner is a device for recognizing and categorizing tokens before they are passed on to the grammar. Interactions. between the scanner and the grammar can be quite complex. In some cases when the same token is used as a different symbol in different contexts (e.g., using "A" as quantifier (Ax) and as a set) quite subtle changes must be made to the scanner or the grammar.
The output grammar is a collection of formatting programs that map the internal LISP-like representation into a formatted external string.
Thus surface string "i likes x better than y in N" is mapped from the list (IndividualStrietPref i x y N) . The output grammar contains information about the output tokens and their order of concatenation so that either the informal "i likes x better than y on N" or the formal "i: x, y IN" can be generated.
CURRICULIUM DESCRIPTION
We can divide the course development into three sections. The first section introduces the basic notions of weak preference, strict preference, and indifference together with completeness and transitivity axioms for weak preference. The main result in this section is the trichotomy theorem. A simple consequence of completeness, it is important in its partitioning of the space of possible attitudes towards two alternatives x, y. By trichotomy one either likes x better than y, likes y better than x, or is indifferent and likes one the same as the other. Several other simple propositions are proved by the student in this introductory section such as the antisymmetry of strict choice, the reflexivity of weak preference, and the substitutability of items which are indifferent into preference contexts.
The curriculum in the first section opens with an introduction to the central question of social choice: What (if any) is the best way to pass from many individual choices to one social choice? Condorcet's paradox of majority rule is used to show that the question does not have an obvious general solution. After an overview of the aims of social choice theory the basic notions and the parallel expressions for individual preferences are introduced.
The second section is the longest. Entitled From Individual to Social Choice it begins with a detailed intuitive treatment of islands including some simple island existence axioms which are used later for Sen's theorem. Axioms and definitions for social choice corresponding to those for individual choice are introduced together with the appropriate set of linguistic expressions. As a prelude to the ethical axioms, the notions of decisiveness, local-decisiveness, and decisiveness-between which relate individual to .social choice are described. The Liberalism axiom There 'are two individuals i andj who are each decisive between a respective pair of alternatives is stated. Dictatorship is defined as decisiveness for every agenda. It is then proved that liberalism and dictatorship are inconsistent. After showing the incompleteness of the unanimous ordering, Pareto is introduced:
If everyone likes x better than y on N then so does society.
The notion of a Paretian liberal is defined and Sen's theorem is proved. The section ends with a treatment of the independence of irrelevant alternatives:
If everyone likes x better than y on N iff they do the same on M then society chooses x over y on N iff it does so on M.
The third and last section contains the proof of Arrow's result: independence of irrelevant alternatives, Pareto and non-dictatorship are mutually incompatible. It is first proved that local decisiveness foran agenda can be extended to decisiveness for any agenda. Hence local decisiveness implies dictatorship. The conclusion of the course establishes that there is indeed someone locally decisive for some pair. Hence the conditions ·Pareto, independenceof irrelevant alternatives, and non-dictatorship cannot be jointly satisfied. The proofthat there is a local decisive individual uses the notion of (locally) decisive sets of individuals together with the fact that there is a smallest set oflocally decisive individuals. The proof shows that the smallest set contains one member-the locally decisive individual.
